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Abstract 
 
This paper examines despair from the perspectives of many disciplines to define 
despair and to characterize the despairing individual, his motivations, and his capacity 
for decision-making. Two models incorporating despair as a key element are then 
proposed.  Using these models as a framework, the economics literature is examined 
to determine the extent to which economics has, at least implicitly, recognized despair, 
without necessarily confronting it either in theory or policy design, and argue why this 
failure has weakened both our theory and our policy.  The paper concludes with the 
suggestions that economics can and, perhaps, should incorporate despair, narrowly, 
and economic agents’ emotional state, generally, into its theoretical and policy 
analyses. 
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The Economic Consequences of Despair 
Despair refers to a state of mind caused by circumstances that seem too much to cope 
with.  Despair suggests total loss of hope, which may be passive or may drive one to 
furious efforts.. .1   
 
I  Introduction 
Despair does not fit well within the usual confines of economic analysis as it suggests 
behaviors strongly at odds with what is generally thought of as rational decision-
making.  Yet despair has been an all too common state of being for many throughout 
the ages, and remains so today, especially in conditions of sustained economic 
recession and decline. While neither acts of desperation nor the inaction of 
hopelessness can be easily aligned with constrained utility maximization, since neither 
suggests that what is usually thought of as a rational decision can be or has been taken, 
decisions are, explicitly or implicitly, made. To understand these decisions and those 
that make them, and to develop policies to ameliorate the economic consequences of 
despair, despair demands careful economic analysis.  
In this paper I examine despair from the perspectives of many disciplines, from 
theology to literature and art to clinical psychology in an attempt to define despair and 
to characterize the despairing individual, his motivations, and his capacity for 
decision-making.  Having done so, I contrast despair with hope, its behavioral 
opposite, and then suggest how despair can be modeled in the context of the standard 
discounted utility model and in the context of a model of goal/identity oriented 
preferences.  Using these models as a framework, I return to the economics literature 
                                                
1despair. Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/despair (accessed: June 14, 2013). 
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and examine the extent to which economics has, at least implicitly, recognized despair, 
without necessarily confronting it either in theory or policy design, and argue why this 
failure has weakened both our theory and our policy.  To conclude, I suggest that 
economics can and, perhaps, should incorporate despair, narrowly, and economic 
agents’ emotional state, generally, into its theoretical and policy analyses. 
II  Characterizing Despair  
From St. Paul’s second letter to the Corinthians onwards, the theological definition of 
despair is the loss of hope of salvation.  To be saved, one must repent one’s sins and 
seek forgiveness.  Since all sins can be forgiven, by God if not by man, no one is 
excluded from salvation a priori. Yet if the sinner despairs, he determines that his own 
sins are unforgivable by God and that penitence, no matter how sincere, will avail of 
nothing.  In this it is the sinner who damns himself by rejecting God’s capacity to 
forgive rather than God rejecting the truly penitent sinner.  This perspective was given 
weight by Origen and other early scholars of the Church, who argued that God would 
have forgiven even Judas Iscariot had he repented rather than judging his sins to be 
unforgivable, even by God, and taking his own life in despair.  Later medieval 
scholars, uncomfortable with the premise that all sins were forgivable, qualified this 
position by suggesting that the act of suicide signaled impenitence, since it was the 
Devil who induced he who despaired to self-harm and suicide (Altschule 1967) while 
still leaving open the path to salvation to the truly penitent.   
The association of despair with suicide generally and Judas specifically was reflected 
in art which reached even the illiterate. Despair was represented by the very 
recognizable suicide, Judas, paired with Hope, represented by the crucified Christ, or 
by a suicide alone, defiantly unrepentant even in death, such as Giotto’s fresco in the 
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Arena Chapel in Padua (Barasch 1999).  Despair was personified in morality plays 
and other literature as a character, variously named Despaire or the Devil, who 
provided the means of suicide, a rusty knife, poison or a noose, to the wavering 
Christian weighed down by sin perceived as unforgivable and seeking release 
(Beecher 1987, MacDonald and Murphy 1990).  The message was clear, accepted and 
central to medieval theology (Lederer 2006), so much so that even suicides that had a 
secular motive, such as crippling debt, a love affair gone wrong, or mental illness, 
were treated as spiritual despair in both law and custom.  Specifically, it was common 
in the Middle Ages for the bodies of suicides to be left unburied, to be mutilated and 
for their property to be seized or destroyed, thereby imposing misery or ruin on their 
families (Murray 2000, MacDonald and Murphy 1990).  The sins of the fathers were 
visited on their sons. 
Thomas Aquinas, in Summa Theologica (1947 [1265-74]), examines despair in the 
context of his exploration of the eleven passions (emotions).  Aquinas characterizes 
these passions as either concupiscible or irascible.  Each of the concupiscible passions 
is directed to the understanding of good or evil absolutely.  Each of the irascible 
passions is also directed to good or evil, but these passions reflect what is arduous to 
obtain or to avoid (Miller 2012). Thus, the object of despair is an unattainable good, 
well worth attaining but perceived to be beyond the despairing’s grasp no matter how 
hard he tries, leaving him to do without the good (King 1999).  When hope (of one’s 
own salvation through the grace of God) is given up, that is, when one despairs, one is 
drawn away from the good, from God and from one’s fellow man, and into sin.  
Despair, which destroys hope, does not require that one is without faith and 
consequently does not believe in God’s grace, but only that God’s grace does not 
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extend to oneself.  This can lead, eventually, to loss of faith and to hatred of God, the 
worst of all sins (Snyder 1965).   
Luther suggests that, contra Thomas, despair leads to rather than away from salvation 
(Snyder 1965).  For Luther, there are two sources of knowledge:  God’s law and the 
Gospel.  Through God’s law, man learns that he is born in sin and is, thereby, damned.  
Man, through the Gospel, which he can only access via God’s law, discovers God’s 
mercy, the only means of man’s salvation.  God’s law forces man to recognize that he 
is damned, and this recognition leads to despair:  he is nothing without God’s grace.  
This realization opens to him the knowledge of the Gospel and the prospect of 
salvation.  Despair, the descent into and journey through hell, for Luther, was a 
prerequisite for salvation.  So, too, for Calvin, yet for Calvin despair afflicts only the 
pre-conversion elect or those who have not truly converted and are thus not of the 
elect.  For Luther, life is a continual struggle against despair since the spirit always is 
beset by doubt.  For Calvin, not so, except for those who were not members of the 
elect who were forever barred from God’s mercy.  The journey to salvation, in the 
Protestant tradition, was through hell (despair) where many remained.   The Protestant 
and Thomist portrayals of despair permeate Western culture.  Spenser’s Redcrosse 
Knight in The Faerie Queene (1978 [1590-1609]) journeyed through hell to emerge 
strengthened and saved (Snyder 1965), while the lives and deaths of Graham Greene’s 
protagonists in his novels Brighton Rock (1938) and The Heart of the Matter (1948) 
exemplify Thomistic despair (Sinclair 2011).  
For Kierkegaard, like Luther, life, the process of discovering one’s true self, a self 
only defined in relation to God, is a battle with despair (McDonald 2012).  
Kierkegaard defines three levels of despair:  ignorant despair, in which the individual 
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is ignorant of having a self, despair in weakness, in which the individual does not try 
to be himself, and defiant despair, in which the individual recognizes the eternal 
aspect of himself, that which makes him himself, determines to become himself, but 
rejects God’s essential role in the process (Banks 2004). Thus, despair comes from 
trying to know oneself without God, although it is only in relation to God that the self, 
the true self, can be realized (McDonald 2012).  That is, in despair one despairs of 
one’s own sins and despairs of the forgiveness of those sins:  the sinner, and everyone 
is a sinner, rejects God’s forgiveness, a sin against the Holy Spirit, and thus is 
unforgivable.  In winning the battle with God to become oneself by oneself, one loses 
oneself:  the self is not defined in the absence of God.  To defeat despair one must go 
beyond the finite and humanly attainable, have faith in God, have faith in the infinite 
possibility of God’s forgiveness to effect what is humanly impossible, accept God’s 
judgment and thereby find one’s true self in relation to God (Podmore 2009). 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy mirrors his own spiritual struggle.  It is also the struggle 
faced in Ibsen’s play Brand (1912), where the protagonist, Brand, unlike Kierkegaard, 
rejects God, and in his defiant despair not only loses his own life but the lives of his 
family and his parishioners (Banks 2004). 
While Kierkegaard examines despair in the context of man’s relationship with himself 
and with God, Gabriel Marcel examines man in the context of the world in which he 
lives (Treanor 2010).  Man is defined by his ontological exigencies, his sense of being, 
and his need for experience that transcends the material world.  This need is 
accompanied by a sense that something is amiss, that the world is broken, a 
dissatisfaction that cannot be assuaged, as the transcendence of the material world 
cannot be achieved on one’s own.  But, if man does not feel that something is amiss, 
does not feel dissatisfied, and cannot reflect on the need for transcendence, his 
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transcendent exigency will atrophy to the point of absence.  He will not view the 
world as being broken yet it is its brokenness that killed his transcendent exigency 
leaving him as only a functional entity.  He will be reduced to a machine-like 
existence living a life in despair unable to participate meaningfully in his own reality. 
Having will replace being.  He will neither be available to himself nor to others 
(Pamplume 1953).  He will be without hope so that the current situation, despair, is 
final and irrevocable.  He will be alienated from being.   
Steinbock (2007) defines despair, from the perspective of phenomenology, as the 
impossibility of the ground for hope.  This impossibility is not attached to a particular 
situation or event, for were this the case, while the particular situation would be 
hopeless (a particular goal could not be achieved), this hopelessness would be 
confined to this situation.  With despair the impossibility of the ground for hope 
encompasses everything.  Everything is hopeless (no goals can be achieved no matter 
how much effort is expended).  While hope is oriented positively toward meaning, 
despair is oriented toward lack of meaning.  He who despairs perceives himself to be 
completely abandoned (by society, by God), now and forever.  He has no control over 
his life, and so gives up on everything since nothing is possible.  Because despair 
affects him at the spiritual level, suicide can be contemplated since life has no 
meaning, no value, neither now nor in the future.  In despair he has no future, since 
nothing is possible, and he cannot retreat to the past since it cannot redeem the present.  
He is imprisoned in the present in a life totally devoid of meaning and to which 
meaning will not affix. 
The evolutionary biologist, Rudolph Nesse (1999) examines despair as an emotion, 
which must be (have been) beneficial since it has survived the evolutionary selection 
 7 
process.  Despair is aroused as a result of the perception that a goal one has sought to 
achieve is unobtainable despite one’s best efforts.  It is an emotion that arises along 
the path toward a goal, and since the goal is socially construed as important, 
recognizing that there is nothing one can do to achieve the goal can cause one to 
despair.  The goal could be a happy marriage, supporting one’s family, having a 
successful career, or salvation.  The point is that despair is an emotion common across 
cultures.  The question is, can despair, while painful, have a salutary effect by 
enabling a reassessment of ones goals?   From this perspective, the pain and suffering 
caused by despair provides a signal that something is wrong and to which a response 
is required. If emotions aid fitness, in a Darwinian sense, then these emotions, part of 
the body’s management and resource allocation system, would be positively selected 
for, thereby improving our species ability to survive. 
From Nesse’s perspective there are gradations of despair, despair that sends the signal 
that a new path needs to be taken or a goal revised downward, a signal that may only 
be interpretable after a period of stasis in which action cannot be taken, and despair 
from which there is no exit.  In the former the period of stasis is characterized by low 
self-esteem, lack of initiative, impaired imagination.  The despairing individual is 
rendered incapable of action and must wait until the situation clarifies itself so the 
decision to give up or to persevere, but with lowered expectations, can be made. In the 
latter, the signal is effective, but the period of stasis endures, as there is neither a new 
path nor possible goal revision.  All is lost.   
Connor and Walton (2011) examine the psychological literature on despair, in which 
despair is referred to as existential distress or demoralization.  Despair/ 
demoralization has been found to be comorbid with clinical depression, but it is not 
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clinical depression (Clarke and Kissane 2002).  Although it is often not effectively 
distinguished from depression, the symptoms have been found to be distinct (Jacobsen, 
et al. 2006). Demoralization, as first characterized by Frank (1974) “results from 
persistent failure to cope with internally or externally induced stresses that the person 
and those close to him expect him to handle…. The person’s self-esteem is damaged, 
and he feels rejected by others because of his failure to meet their expectations.  
Insofar as the meaning and significance of life derives from the individual’s ties with 
persons whose values he shares, alienation may contribute to a sense of the 
meaninglessness of life” (Frank 1974, p.271).  “They feel powerless to change the 
situation or themselves and cannot extricate themselves from their predicament” 
(Frank and Frank 1993, p.35).  This may lead to recklessness, violence and nihilism 
(Hillbrand and Young 2008). Thus, demoralization is an existential state (a state of 
being) that affects how individuals view their world, their place in it, and their 
experiences of it.  Its causes are individual, such as loss or grief, and societal, such as 
cultural dislocation or welfare dependency. It robs individuals of their self-esteem, 
their ability to act, to cope, to control their own feelings and behaviors, to respond in 
some/all difficult situations and leaves them feeling isolated.  It is as much a challenge 
to recognize/diagnose, as it is to ameliorate, since each individual’s despair is 
different.   However, the demoralized can be reached and helped, if not cured (Connor 
and Walton 2012, Hillbrand and Young 2008). Just as Spenser’s Redcrosse Knight 
needed Úna to save him from Despaire and return him to the path to salvation in The 
Faerie Queene, the despairing individual may need a therapist’s helping hand. 
Common themes run throughout these characterizations of despair.  First, despair is a 
social malady.  Despair excludes the individual from society, a society he has or 
perceives himself to have abandoned through his actions or one that has abandoned 
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him. Second, re-entry into that society is or is perceived to be exceedingly difficult, 
perhaps impossible.  Third, because the despairing sit outside society they are not 
necessarily or do not perceive themselves to be bound by its conventions.  Fourth, 
social relationships become difficult or impossible.  Fifth, the ability to act, to cope 
even with the quotidian, atrophies or is lost. Apathy, lethargy, recklessness and 
suicide are common responses to despair.   Sixth, life is without value or meaning.  
This state of may be temporary or permanent.  If temporary, life after emerging from 
despair has less value.  If permanent, a future, any future, cannot be imagined.   
III  Hope:  the Antithesis of Despair 
Pecchenino (2011) examines hope, despairs opposite, from the perspective of many 
disciplines to establish its place in economic thought.  From her review of the 
literature she finds the following.  First, that most of the theories of hope have a 
strong future goal orientation where the future looms large in an individual’s decision 
making process.  The present, rather than the future, is discounted.  Second, goal 
attainment depends on an individual’s desire and ability to transform what is into 
what should be or to move toward what should be or what will be even if that goal is 
known to be unattainable through human effort:  nothing is impossible.  Third, 
theories of hope address the process of living, the journey one is taking, which 
suggests that one’s preferences and one’s hopes are redefined by the constraints one 
faces, such as age or disability. These theories provide a means of understanding or 
accepting fortune and misfortune with equanimity.  All is never lost.  Fourth, hope is 
not irrational but may rely on an individual’s ability to filter, sort and selectively use 
information.  Fifth, the hopeful are in and of society. 
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In comparing hope and despair we find that hope is about possibility, despair is about 
impossibility; hope is about defining and achieving goals, despair is about loss of 
goals and the means of achieving them; hope is about the future, despair is about the 
loss of that future.  Hope is the antithesis of despair.   Thus, to model despair we draw 
upon models of hope. 
IV  Modelling Despair2 
IV.1  The standard model 
In its most basic formulation, the discounted utility model, the standard model of 
intertemporal decision making by a rational, utility maximising individual, defines an 
individual’s intertemporal preferences over consumption profiles from an initial date t 
to a terminal date T, where the utility function is assumed to be time separable and the 
rate at which the future is discounted is assumed to be constant.  That is 
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is her discount function, which is the weight the individual in period t places on her 
well being in period t + k, and ρ is her pure rate of time preference:  her discount rate. 
Under the assumption of perfect capital markets whereby individuals can borrow 
against future income or lend at a fixed, known interest rate, individuals choose their 
                                                
2 The analysis in this section is drawn from my earlier work on hope.  See Pecchenino (2011).   
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optimal lifetime consumption profile subject to their lifetime budget constraint.  If 
there is an unanticipated change to the individual’s budget set in period t + j, she just 
re-optimizes as of the period when the change becomes known.  If the change is 
voluntary, then one simply compares consumption profiles under the original budget 
set to consumption profiles under the revised budget set (or, more succinctly, 
compares budget sets).   It is straightforward to add uncertainty.  What is essential is 
that agents optimize as of the initial date, follow their optimal plan, and reoptimize if 
there is an unanticipated change to their budget/choice sets.   
IV.2  When there is no tomorrow 
In the standard discounted utility model outlined above, individuals’ discount the 
future at a constant rate via a discount function defined by equation 2.  This 
formulation implies that an individual’s preferences are time consistent:  the decision 
he takes today to be carried out ten days, months, years hence is precisely the decision 
he will take once those ten days, months, years have elapsed.  However, empirical 
analyses have suggested that individuals do not exhibit time consistent behavior.  To 
model this, an alternative discount function was posited 
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where β and δ  are constants less than unity, yielding a declining discount rate 
between the current period and the next and a constant discount rate between any two 
periods thereafter.  This formulation, (pseudo) hyperbolic discounting, yields strongly 
present biased, time inconsistent (if a constant discount rate represents true, 
underlying preferences), decision making.  Further, when the future arrives, again the 
present looms large relative to the new future, and present biased decisions continue 
to be made instead of those planned to be made from the perspective of the previous 
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period looking into the yet unattained future. Behaviors, such as over-eating, under-
saving, procrastination, and addiction can be explained by the present bias. 
By slightly adjusting the discount function so that βδ > 1, then instead of a declining 
discount rate between the current period and the next, one has an increasing discount 
rate between the current period and the next, yielding future biased, time inconsistent 
(the same caveat applies), decision making.   This could be the discount function of 
the hopeful (Pecchenino, 2011). For the despairing individual, as distinct from the 
time consistent, the hyperbolic present-biased or the hyperbolic future-biased, the 
future, any future proximate or distant, is difficult to imagine and, thus, to plan.  This 
can be modeled by β approaching zero, causing the future to shrink to insignificance 
in the agent’s utility calculus, and the agent’s budget set contracting, leaving the 
individual with few resources to pursue any plans.   Unable to conceptualize and 
effect a future, any future, the agent’s world collapses.   
IV.3  Goal-oriented preferences and individual identity 
In standard economic analysis an individual has preferences defined over goods, 
services, and leisure.  More of each is always better, although subject to diminishing 
marginal utility, and the goods, services, and leisure may be complementary or 
substitutable.  Preferences are not defined relatively but rather absolutely.  However, 
preferences can also be defined over individual identities (Akerlof and Kranton 2000), 
or socially referenced, so that how one’s consumption of goods, services or leisure or 
how one’s wealth, income or employment status, or how one’s support of one’s 
family compares to others’ determines how satisfied one is.  This preference structure 
can be adapted so social references, such as comparisons of income with one’s 
neighbors, are replaced by personal or social goals one hopes to attain or which 
society deems important to obtain, such as a personal or social identity, as in Brekke, 
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et al. (2003), or aspirations as in Dalton, Ghosal and Mani (forthcoming). Thus how 
close one is able to come to achieving one’s overall goal or set of goals, both now and 
in the future, can determine one’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction/despair when goals 
are perceived to be unachievable.  These goals can be very specific – to be gainfully 
employed or to support one’s family – or more general and existential – being 
forgiven and receiving salvation, but all require that actions be taken and resources 
dedicated to achieve or move toward one’s goals.   
Using the model proposed by Jeitschko, O’Connell and Pecchenino (2008), changing 
the notation to reflect the current application, suppose agents’ plan to achieve a goal 
or set of goals, which can be thought of as an identity or a set of identities which 
define who the person would hope to be or would despair of not being able to become.  
Following standard theory, the individual agent has a single preference ordering 
defined over N distinct goals.  Some goals may be dominated and therefore not 
undertaken.  The agent invests effort to achieve his personal ideal goal set (which 
depends on his preference ordering and actual and perceived constraints).  The 
individual goals, however, can be in conflict and may not be mutually compatible.  
That is, achieving one goal may move one further away from another goal.  The utility 
maximizing agent seeks to balance these forces.    
Let  
 ),...,( **11 NN ggggU −−        (4) 
represent an individual’s utility defined over goals, his preference ordering over goals 
which defines his overall or composite utility or personal self-image/identity.  Utility 
is a function of his n=1, …, N goals, gn,  relative to its ideal, gn*, that is,  gn – gn* , for 
all n.  Assume Un(…, gn – gn*,…) > 0 (<0) for gn – gn* < 0 (>0), for all n = 1,… ,N and 
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that Unn ≤ 0 for all n = 1,…,N.  The sign of Unm n ≠ m is positive if his n and m goals 
are complements, negative if they are substitutes, and zero if they are independent.   
Assume one’s goals and the effort, resources – emotional, psychological, spiritual, 
intellectual, and economic – expended, required to attain them are related as follows  
 )(ˆ ** nnnnn eegg ν−=−        (5) 
where 
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where neˆ  is the effort the individual puts into his nth goal, which is the sum of his 
effort dedicated to his nth goal, en,  and any spillover from effort dedicated to his other 
goals, βmnem, for all m, where βmn < 1.  en*(νn) represents the individual’s belief of the 
collective (social) belief (Orléan 2004) of the effort required to attain the hoped for  
ideal, a construct that depends on the society in which the individual lives both 
narrowly and broadly defined, or the individual’s self-assessment of the effort 
required to attain his personal goal, where νn is a vector of conditioning variables – 
focal points or probabilities of achievement, upon which beliefs about goal n are 
conditioned.  Among these conditioning variables could be the individual’s 
emotional/existential state (Pfister and Böhm 2008), the moral strictures of the society 
of which the individual is part (Kaplow and Shavell 2007), the individual’s 
circumstances that are determined in part by the individual’s (relative) wealth or 
poverty (Dalton, Ghosal and Mani, forthcoming), the neighborhood in which he lives 
(Ellen and Turner 1997; Atkinson and Kintrea 2004)), or the acute (Buckert, et al. 
2014) or chronic stress the individual is under. Thus, how hopeful or despairing 
(hopeless) an individual is determines, in part, the perceived cost of effort required to 
reach a goal.  The more hopeful/despairing an individual, the higher/lower is the 
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perceived return to effort. Conditioning variables and the collective or individual 
beliefs implied can depend on context.   
Substituting the relationship of effort to goal achievement into the individual’s utility 
function, the individual’s task is to allocate his resources  
∑=
n
nee ,  0≥ne          (7) 
optimally; that is, to devise a plan to achieve his desired goals.  Since an individual’s 
total resources are a function of his emotional, psychological, spiritual, intellectual 
and economic resources, they are not fixed but, instead, are increasing (decreasing) in 
hopefulness (hopelessness/despair).  
The agent thus optimizes  
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subject to his resource and nonnegativity constraints.  The first-order conditions of the 
agent’s problem are 
 0mn nn m
m n
U U β λ µ
≠
+ − + =∑ , n = 1,…, N     (9) 
where λ is the marginal disutility of effort, and µn is the multiplier on the 
nonnegativity constraint.  µn > 0 if the optimal choice of en ≤ 0:  all effort is put into 
the individual’s other goals since the marginal disutility of effort exceeds the marginal 
utility of effort invested in that goal either directly or indirectly.  Thus, for the low 
hope or despairing individual many goals will be ruled out as too onerous to achieve 
while the opposite will be true for the high hope individual.  For those in the depth of 
despair, all goals, no matter how strongly desired, may be seen as unachievable.  
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In this model individuals’ utility is defined over goals rather than the more standard 
consumption and leisure, although goals could contain consumption and leisure as 
elements.  An individual’s hopefulness or lack thereof affects the cost of achieving his 
goals and the resources he has to do so.  The utility function does not conform to 
expected utility assumptions since probabilities, whether exogenous, affected by own 
actions or conditioned by hope or despair, are embedded in the effort required for 
attainment of one’s goal ideal.  Further, utility is neither separable across goals with 
different probabilities of achievement nor across time.  By including probabilities of 
success as just one of many conditioning variables which determine the effort 
required for achievement of one’s goal ideal allows, for example, other conditioning 
variables could reinforce a low probability of success for the despairing individual 
while mitigating or contradicting the same for a hopeful individual. Given this 
structure it is possible to analyze the interactions across goals and plans (see Jeitschko, 
O’Connell and Pecchenino, 2008, for derivations) to achieve those goals as a result of 
changes in this environment – changes in the conditioning variables or probabilities of 
success, whether exogenous, functions of own effort, or of one’s existential state, that 
cause collective or individual beliefs to change, and the effects of substitutability or 
complementarity of goals.   
Since an individual’s resources are limited, goal attainment may be constrained 
regardless of how hopeful or despairing the individual is.  Thus, an individual must 
allocate his resources taking into account complementaries across goals, 
substitutability across goals, and spillovers of effort, both positive and negative, 
across goals.  When goals are complementary individuals try to achieve a balance 
between them.  So, if one becomes more difficult to achieve, directly or via a change 
in conditioning variables, the agent will reallocate resources away from the relatively 
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easily attained goal to the relatively more difficultly attained goal to maintain a 
balance.  The paths to the goals are adjusted given the new information, but not the 
goals themselves.  But, if goals are strong substitutes the individual may find it best to 
concentrate on the relatively more easily achieved goal, thereby reducing the 
resources dedicated to the goal which is now more difficult to achieve.  For goals that 
are strongly substitutable this could be seen simply as finding a better path to one 
permutation of the ultimate hoped for goal.   As despair deepens, the agent’s choice 
set shrinks:  as the effort required to achieve anything rises and his resource 
endowment falls few, if any, goals remain achievable.   
V  Economic decisions when in despair 
Suicide has been associated with despair since at least the first century AD.  Suicide 
has also been seen to have economic causes, as analyzed by Hamermesh and Soss 
(1974), Marcotte (2003), Ludwig, Marcotte and Norberg (2009) and Campaniello, 
Diasakos, and Mastrobuoni (2012), among others, without reference to despair but 
with reference to an individual’s psychological and/or mental health state. 
Hamermesh and Soss (1974) found that reductions in permanent income, perhaps as a 
result of unemployment, could cause a rational individual to value death as preferable 
to life and so choose to commit suicide. In their analysis, suicide is a rational choice 
that depends on expected income over one’s remaining life, the cost of maintaining 
oneself and one’s family at an acceptable level, and one’s aversion to suicide. While 
their analysis does not, and is recognized not to, take all psychological pressures into 
account, it highlights some of the key economic variables that may impinge upon the 
choice.  Marcotte (2003) examines attempted suicide as a cry for help which, if heard, 
leads to increased income, and Ludwig, et al. (2009) examines the negative 
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correlation between anti-depressant use and suicide.  Finally, Campaniello, et al. 
(2012) analyze the effect of an amnesty on suicide rates in Italian prisons.  
These analyses of suicidal behavior can all be captured in the goal-oriented preference 
model outlined above.  Thus, when an individual’s marginal disutility of effort 
exceeds the marginal benefit of effort to, for example, maintain self and family at an 
acceptable level, where all conditioning variables, such as his aversion to suicide, love 
of family as well as his existential/emotional state which makes imaging a future 
difficult and drains the individual of internal resources, are taken fully into account, 
the individual may choose to commit suicide.  Attempted suicide as a cry for help 
loosens the individual’s resource constraint making goal achievement more likely.  
This cry for help is consistent with Connor and Walton’s (2012) and Hillbrand and 
Young’s (2008) view that the despairing need and can benefit from external help, 
where this external help weakens the resource constraint, thereby making goal 
attainment possible.  Anti-depressants may have much the same effect as they reduce 
clinical depression, which is comorbid with despair, and thereby increase the 
individual’s resources by improving his psychological wellbeing without alleviating 
his despair.  The effects of the anti-depressants may also change the conditioning 
variables such that goal attainment is perceived as less onerous.  An amnesty provides 
hope to the hopeless (the incarcerated), again loosening the resource constraint while 
causing a change in the conditioning variables that would make goal attainment less 
onerous once one is released.   
When suicide is chosen, either because it is the only goal generating a positive net 
benefit or because the future has no value, the individual may chose to leave this life 
quietly.  However, he may also choose to leave this life in defiant display in an odd 
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inversion of Adam Smith’s acknowledgement that fame, even after death, is a 
motivator (Ashraf, et al. 2005). This is because a public or dramatic suicide can bring 
attention to one’s desperation and its causes and afford a positive, if posthumous, 
recognition of one’s life (see Povoledo and Carvajal 2012, Waterfield 2012, and Vogt 
2012), one’s desperation, and the needs of one’s family, who might, thereby, be cared 
for as a consequence of one’s death. The situation of female suicide bombers is 
similar.  In life they have no future and their continued existence can bring shame and 
burden to their families.  In choosing suicide, martyrdom, their deaths bring honor and 
metaphorical riches to their families (Victor 2003).   Finally, one can choose to leave 
this life in the company of one’s family.   Wilson, Daly and Daniele (1995) find that 
those made despondent by significantly reduced circumstances determine that not 
only is their life of no value, but that without them neither are the lives of their family 
members.  Familicide is the only answer. 
The behavior of the long-term unemployed, like that of the suicidal, may be better 
understood if considered through the lens of despair. Economists have long 
recognized that sustained unemployment can have severe adverse psychological as 
well as economic effects (see Goldsmith, et al, 1995, 1996a,b).  While unemployment 
itself has been shown to be significantly important to an individual’s wellbeing, it is 
not the loss of income, the narrowly economic, that accounts for its importance 
(Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998, Clark and Oswald 1994, Blanchflower and 
Oswald 2004, Knabe and Ratzel 2011) but the nonpecuniary aspects of 
unemployment such as the social and psychological costs of unemployment, as first 
noted by Jahoda, et al. (1933).   Subsequent studies show that long-term 
unemployment is strongly correlated with poor physical and mental health, social 
isolation, social exclusion, low self-esteem, low self-efficacy, low self-belief, loss of 
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identity, inability to act (to organize one’s life, to search for a job), criminal behavior, 
alcohol and drug abuse, self-harm, and suicide  (Cooper 2011, Stuckler, et al. 2011, 
Wanberg 2012, Proudfoot, et al. 1997, Goldsmith, et al. 1996a,b, Brenner 1976, 
Catalano, et al. 2011, Choudhry, et al. 2012). 
Should some long-term unemployed individuals fall into despair, they may assess the 
marginal benefit of effort to achieve their heretofore sought complementary 
goals/identities of being gainfully employed and adequately maintaining their family 
and their social relationships as less than the marginal cost for any feasible level of 
effort. This diminution/destruction of goals/identities could be because conditioning 
variables, such as one’s emotional/existential state (Pfister and Böhm 2008), which is 
affected by both endogenous and exogenous forces, and societal mores that 
individually apply (Kaplow and Shavell 2007), have changed. As a result the 
relevance of and the preference ordering over goals is altered, the cost of effort, and 
thus goal attainment, is increased as the ability to act atrophies, and the society of 
which, as a member of the long-term unemployed, one feels a part is changed from 
that of the mainstream to that of the marginalized.   Now attainable identities could 
include identities completely dominated when employed or when one aspires to be or 
again to be employed.  
For those long-term unemployed in a state of despair, active labor market policies to 
address long-term unemployment evaluated by Card, et al. (2010) that are designed 
under the assumption that the unemployed are rational, discounted utility maximizing 
agents may be doomed to failure.  Although the now unemployed, rational agent 
would take the exogenous state of nature and the requirements of the labor activation 
policies as given, optimize his lifetime utility, and prove the labor activation policies a 
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success, this would not be the case for the despairing.   Ignoring unemployed agents’ 
emotional/existential and marginalized state in the design of policy can impede policy 
effectiveness precisely when it is most necessary that the policies succeed as in the 
current Great Recession or in response to technological displacement (Frey and 
Osborne, 2013).  While not all unemployed, even Gielen and Van Ours’s (2012) 
unhappy unemployed, despair, those who do heavily discount the future, perceive the 
cost of (all) effort as high and perceive the returns as negligible.  For these 
unemployed a good job, a goal to which they aspire, may not be worth the effort to try 
to get or to keep simply because the marginal cost of obtaining and keeping the job 
overwhelms the marginal benefit, or, similarly, that their resources are insufficient to 
obtain the goal thus removing it from their choice sets. 
Consider the following components of many labor activation programs:  
retraining/upskilling, a temporary job, wage insurance.   Job training, upskilling, and 
temporary job placements are standard elements of labor activation programs 
designed specifically to return the long-term, generally structurally, unemployed to 
the labor market.  Any or all of these could be evaluated as generating negative net 
benefit by the despairing individual (high cost/low returns of effort), and thus would 
not be freely chosen. However, they are often mandatory as a condition of receiving 
social welfare payments and can deepen despair (Mazzerole and Singh 2002) and 
further undermine the willingness to undertake the training (Titmuss 1970, Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee 1997).  Here the failure to recognize the unemployed individual’s 
skills, perhaps now technologically obsolete but previously the foundation upon 
which his earnings were based, and the make-work (charity) interpretation of the 
temporary job can re-emphasize the individual’s loss of status, signal that the 
individual is no longer a member “in good standing” in society, fail to recognize the 
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individual’s previous contributions to that society and thereby weaken the ties to the 
mainstream society implicitly strengthening ties to other more marginal social 
grouping.  That is, the policies can effectively change the conditioning variables upon 
which the costs and benefits of taking specific actions are determined.  Policies can 
push individuals out of the labor force even though their intention is to pull them in.  
Providing wage insurance to ease the transition to a lower-wage job for a worker may, 
again, change the conditioning variables by reinforcing the despairing individual’s 
feeling of worthlessness and reducing his strength of commitment to mainstream 
society (contra LaLonde 2007) rather than having the desired salutary effect in part 
because to be in receipt of the wage insurance one needs to have a job when the net 
marginal benefit of obtaining that job may be perceived to be negative.   
For policies to be effective in helping those unemployed who are in despair, they need 
to be designed taking into account that the cost of effort to the unemployed may be 
much higher and the benefit much lower than one would assume if the unemployed 
agent were a typical rational, utility maximizing agent. Policy makers must recognize 
that an individual’s effort requires emotional, psychological, spiritual, intellectual and 
economic resources, where these resources may be significantly constrained, and 
valuations of costs and benefits are conditioned on/by the individual’s 
emotional/existential state, his perception of his place in (not in) society, and his 
hopes and aspirations.  These considerations apply not only to the unemployed, but 
also to the homeless, whether on the street (Wolch, Dear and Akita 1988) or in 
institutions, such as nursing homes, that are not home (Carboni 1990), and to 
discouraged workers and those discriminated against as a result of race, class, family 
background and/or place of residence (Bjørnstad 2006, Körner, Reitzle and 
Silbereisen 2012, Heslin, Bell and Fletcher 2012, Atkinson and Kintrea 2004)) who 
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also despair.   For policies to be effective the person in society, rather than the 
hypothesized agent, must be at the center of policy design. 
 
 
VI  Conclusion 
By examining individuals in despair, understanding how despair affects their available 
resources, their valuations of the costs and benefits of effort aimed at achieving their 
desired identities, and their ability to plan for or conceptualize a future, it is possible 
to adapt our thinking, our models and our policies to account for despair.  This 
analysis suggests, more broadly, that the individual’s emotional/existential state 
affects nontrivially the individual’s resources, valuations, rate of time preference, and, 
thus, decisions.  Recognizing this in our analyses does not require that we abandon 
our assumption of rationality; rather it requires that we develop a more nuanced 
conception of rationality.  We should, as economists, be able to model better the 
individual, in isolation or in society, and design better policies to improve that 
individual’s lot.  We need not despair. 
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